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Sometimes when we unintentionally or
intentionally retrieve a memory of a past
episode, we experience one or more addi-
tional memories, which spring to mind
quickly and uncontrollably. For example,
one might involuntarily remember seeing
mummies in the British Museum, and this
memory could in turn trigger a memory of
seeing the Egyptian collection at the natural
history museum in New York City. Known
as an involuntary autobiographical mem-
ory chaining (1, 2), this memory phenom-
enon is probably common in everyday life
when we are engaged in controlled, volun-
tary recall of the past, and when memories
just come to mind unintentionally [Ref. (1–
3); see also (4–6), for reviews of involun-
tary remembering]. Involuntary memory
chaining has not been researched as much
as singly experienced involuntary memo-
ries (i.e., the case where an involuntary
memory does not result in additional invol-
untary retrievals), so comparatively little
is known about them. However, studies
that have focused on involuntary memory
chains have turned up findings with inter-
esting implications for theories of auto-
biographical memory organization (7, 8).
In this article, I review how these findings
have helped develop a theory of autobio-
graphical memory organization that posits
that episodic memories are organized as
conceptual classes of events.
I have argued that involuntary mem-
ory chains are the products of spreading
activation in the autobiographical memory
system (2, 6). Thus, when a memory is acti-
vated in the autobiographical memory sys-
tem (e.g., as a result of voluntary or invol-
untary retrieval), this activation spreads to
other memories in its associative network.
Normally, these types of activations do
not come into consciousness because they
are either too weak or irrelevant to one’s
current cognitive activity. However, when
activations are strong enough, or relevant,
they come into consciousness where they
are experienced as chained involuntary
memories.
Although we have no firm evidence that
involuntary memory chains are spreading
activations, there are a number of reasons
why we should see this as a good, tentative
explanation. For one, there is good rea-
son to believe that like semantic memories,
memories in the autobiographical mem-
ory system are networked (or connected)
and therefore capable of activating one
another. Thus, like semantic memory, once
memories are activated in autobiographi-
cal memory, there is an obligatory spread of
activations to neighboring, related memo-
ries within a network. Evidence that such
an architecture exists in autobiographical
memory can be found in priming studies
[e.g., Ref. (3, 9, 10)]. For example, Mace (3)
and Mace and Clevinger (8) have shown
that activating autobiographical memories
in voluntary recall task primes the subse-
quent recall of related memories at some
future point.
Additionally, there is good reason to
doubt that involuntary memory chains are
driven by some sort of alternative retrieval
process other than spreading activation.
For example, the most obvious alterna-
tive explanation is that a single retrieval
cue simply triggers more than one mem-
ory, and since both memories cannot come
to mind at once, they are experienced in
sequence as a chain of memories. If this
view were true, then memories in involun-
tary memories chains should almost always
be related to the retrieval cue that trigger
the first memory, however, just the opposite
is true [see Discussion in Ref. (2)].
Viewing involuntary memory chains
as an automatic retrieval process akin to
spreading activation has led us to assert
that the products of involuntary memory
chains (i.e., the memories found in a chain)
are reflective of the underlying organiza-
tion of autobiographical memory (7, 8).
Thus, examining their output should prove
elucidating to the study of autobiographi-
cal memory organization.
To date, the output of involuntary
memory chains has been observed in
two types of settings, in the laboratory,
where participants reported involuntary
memory chains, resulting from volun-
tary retrievals, and in naturalistic settings,
where participants reported involuntary
memory chains, resulting from involuntary
retrievals (i.e., involuntary memories expe-
rienced in everyday life). In both labora-
tory and naturalistic measures, involuntary
memory chains have consistently exhibited
two types of associative forms: general-
event associated memories or conceptually
associated memories.
In general-event associations, memories
in a chain come from the same general
(or extended) event period [i.e., a general
memory such as the night at the opera, a
trip to London; or a summary memory,
repeated events such as Sunday walks in
the park, see Ref. (11, 12)]. These memo-
ries appear to be connected by the larger
general or summary event, and therefore,
are typically temporally proximate (e.g.,
spanning the same day, evening, week,
month, etc.). In contrast, conceptual asso-
ciations are associated by their overlap-
ping content. For example, they commonly
involve the same people, objects, activities,
or other common themes (such as work or
school). Conceptually associated memories
can span any time period, and therefore,
www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 183 | 1
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mace Involuntary memory chains
temporality does not appear to be their
main organizing principle.
Analyses of the relative proportions of
conceptually associated and general-event
associated involuntary memory chains
have highlighted the importance and dom-
inance of conceptually associations. In
both laboratory and naturalistic mea-
sures, conceptually associated memories
have significantly outnumbered general-
event associated memories, with concep-
tual associations usually exceeding 80% (1,
2, 7, 8). Other analyses and measures have
also revealed conceptual association dom-
inance [see Ref. (7, 8)], and while these
analyses alone could make a strong case
for the idea that episodic memories are
contained mostly in conceptual associa-
tive networks, retention interval analyses of
conceptually and general-event associated
memories have made a more cogent case.
In Mace et al. (8), involuntary memory
chains were divided into three retention
intervals, chains with memories up to a year
old, 1–9 years old, and over 9 years. Analy-
ses of conceptually and general-event asso-
ciations showed the two categories were
equal when memories were up to a year
old (53% conceptual, 47% general event),
but their relative proportions changed dra-
matically when memories were over a year
old (1–9 years, 77%, conceptual, 23%, gen-
eral event; over 9 years, 85%, conceptual,
15%, general event). These data make a
stronger case for a basic conceptual orga-
nization than the simpler data presented
above because they show that conceptual
associations do not just simply outnumber
general-event associations because there
are more of the former type of experiences,
but because the basic architecture funda-
mentally favors forming and maintaining
conceptual consolidations.
For example, let us consider this propo-
sition with memories of being at a wed-
ding. When one remembers an episode
from a wedding they had recently attended
(e.g., within the last few weeks or months),
this memory has a 50% chance of trigger-
ing others episodes from that same event,
and a 50% chance of triggering memories
of having attended other weddings. How-
ever, when one recalls that same episode
some time later (e.g., 2 years later), it now
has an 80% chance of triggering memories
of other weddings. According to the con-
ceptual organization account, this happens
because memories of the wedding initially
consolidate together (as a general-event
network of the wedding), as well as with
memories of other weddings (joining the
existing conceptual network for wedding
memories). However, as time passes, some
or all of the episodes from that memory are
forgotten, leaving the connections to other
wedding memories. Thus, events always
consolidate into their conceptual class (e.g.,
all wedding memories), and it is these con-
nections (or associations) that endure over
time, not the temporal ones (i.e., mem-
ories from a particular wedding). In this
account, general-event memories are lost
quickly because they have a limited, short-
term relevance. So, in the short-term it may
be equally important to remember episodes
from a wedding, or those of other wed-
dings, while in the long term, it is more
important to remember that one has been
to various weddings.
In sum, then, these various finings
showing the dominance of conceptual
associations have led us to assert that
autobiographical memories are organized
primarily, or fundamentally, along concep-
tual lines. While temporal associations are
clearly a part of autobiographical memo-
ries organization [see Ref. (3, 8)], they are
not retained over time as conceptual asso-
ciations are. It is important to emphasize
that we are not claiming that autobiograph-
ical memories are a collection of abstract
or categories association as in semantic
memory. Instead, our use of the term con-
ceptual refers to, for lack of a better term,
experiential type concepts, such as people,
places, locations, activities, and so forth.
Thus, events coalescence according to their
many and varied experiential similarities
[see data in Ref. (8)].
In closing, the study of involuntary
memory chains has been informative to the
study of autobiographical memory organi-
zation. While I have presented some inter-
pretations of the findings, clearly there are
more, and more work is certainly needed to
fully flesh them out. I have also argued (here
and elsewhere) that involuntary memory
chains are spreading activations that are
normally unconscious, but for some reason
they become conscious. This idea is inter-
esting in its own right, and research that
could elucidate why such activations some-
times surface into consciousness is likely to
be informative to understanding involun-
tary retrievals and other areas of cognitive
science and mental experience.
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